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ADOLESCENTS' TOLERANCE TOWARDS THE LEVEL OF MORALITY/IMMORALITY OF MORAL VALUES

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Abstract: *Living in the 21st century, we are witnesses at the humankind's alienation in a postmodern world, and the boundaries that separate good from evil are becoming more and more blurry. The need for rational answers to irrational questions, such as why do people believe in transcendental experiences, why are humans capable of committing atrocious acts, and why are we so breakable and submissive to orders, are just some of the questions that pop into everybody's mind. Now we can, at least in part, offer scientific answers to these questions. The most important factor in man's allegiance to the Supreme is represented by the religious behavior and by the social and political conduct. With the help of cognitive and social explanations, we now know that man is not just a 'tiny insect', incapable of standing up for itself, but is capable of changing social settings, of manipulating the course of the events, and of deciding its own destiny. Moreover, human behavior and human societies are mostly affected by moral values and social standards. That's why it's important to study the distribution of moral values among those who represent the future of every society: adolescents and young adults.*

Keywords: *adolescents, young adults, moral values, morality, religion*

1. Introduction

The development of moral values system among young adults, and their mental self-regulation ability is crucial for a society to work at its best. Some of the researchers associated adolescents' way of giving importance to moral values with their tendency towards moral deeds (Bond, M.H. and Chi, V.M., 1997; Hardy, S.A., and Carlo, G., 2005; Padilla-Walker, L.M. and Carlo, G., 2007 in Hardy, S.A., Padilla-Walker, L.M., Carlo, G., 2008). From here comes out the need for analyzing the means by which Romanian adolescents and young adults are attributing moral values. By apprehending the mechanism by which moral values system works, the use of socialization could be priceless not only for the youth, but for

schools, churches, and other institutions of this kind.

It is said that the human being is, by its nature, religious, aiming for a religious orientation. McCauley comes to the conclusion that, for to have religious ideas or concepts, it is enough to think "naturally" (McCauley, R. in Terrin, A.N., 2004). In agreement with McCauley, Mircea Eliade - the Romanian historian of religion - alleged in *Sacred and profane* that man is, first and foremost, *homo religiosus* - religion marks the most distinct human action: believing (Eliade, M., 1995).

The psychology of religion studies the premises of religious system regarding human personality, its structure, motivations, and psychological mechanisms (Cuciuc, C., 2006). This area has accounted for systematic research starting from 19th century. Yet, remarks regarding the psychology of religious

experience have existed since the early days (Aristotle). The founder of the psychology of religion is thought to be Rudolf Otto (1860-1937), by whom the religious experience is irrational, „a secrecy of horror, power and fascination” (Otto, R., 2006). Freud defined religion as the „widespread obsessional neurosis of humanity” (Freud, S., 1991, p.154). C. G. Jung thought that the religious experience has been located in what he used to call „collective unconsciousness”. In 1950, G. W. Allport considered religion to be founded on feelings and emotions. This subjective perspective has evolved to the point where religion was considered a product of human imagination.

The theorists of cognitive psychology have reduced religion to a collection of religious representations fixed onto our mind through diverse mechanisms. The question posed is not what religion is, but how religious representations are formed (Terrin, A.N., 2004). Some theorists have tried to naturalize human knowledge, involving computational methods and hoping to transpose meanings into physical causes. Cognitive theories complete the phenomenology of religion, giving the opportunity to understand religions without social and cultural biases. But is it possible to completely naturalize the religious experience, like it has been tried to do with the human mind? The risk would be total naturalization, and that would diminish the idea of *homo religiosus* to a simple cerebral mechanism (Terrin, A.N., 2004).

Formerly in history, the areas of morality and religion were overlapped (Cuciuc, C., 2006). Religion had separated as a distinct area of concern before legal systems and even before politics; it substituted, in the first communities, these yet unborn areas. Religious systems had brought up standards of social coexistence before law and morality as distinct preoccupations. Religion has been offering a system of standards and criteria for social cohabitation. Subsequently, some of the criteria have been brought under regulation: you shall not kill, you shall not steal, the prohibition of marriage between close relatives. Thus, there is an autonomous morality referred to profane criteria, which

considers that deeds should be according to profane principles of a rightful cohabitation, and a religious morality which refers to religious criteria: the Bible, the life of Jesus, etc. Nowadays, the values to which people accede are not only religious, and the option for certain values – sacred or profane – relatively divides the moral domain into its religious and profane aspects. The non-believer is neither immoral nor amoral, but he only abides by those values he considers socially or personally useful, with no linkage to the sacred (Cuciuc, C., 2006, pp. 179-182).

Comes out the question if moral and psychological development are related to one another, so that moral development goes hand in hand with psychological development, or at least with some aspects of it. Lawrence Kohlberg considers that there are some stages in the development of morality, and a certain consistency with the psychological development. There are three levels in the development of morality, each level having two stages, therefore six stages overall. These stages start with obedience and fear of punishment, and end with adherence to the principles of universal ethics (Doron, R. and Parot, F., 2006). The sequence of the stages is constant, none of them can be skipped. However, one can remain only at the fourth or fifth stage (Thomas, L. in Singer, P., 2006, pp. 495-496).

It's been noticed that the practice of religion seems to assure the basis for practicing morality, by helping in acquiring moral abilities. By opposition with skeptics, religious people analyze and criticize their level of morality, resulting in an increase of moral abilities. However, religion is not imperative for the development of morality – a non-religious environment could lead to moral abilities as well (Rossano, M.J., 2008). In that direction, two researchers, wanting to identify criteria by which moral persons could be identified, found out that for 19 out of 24 persons religion has been an important aspect of moral attitudes and deeds (Colby, A. and Damon, W., 1992). Although religion seems to offer increased possibilities for the development of moral abilities, some of its aspects have had the opposite effect. For



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example, negative beliefs about the self and about the humankind in general, encouraged by the concept of primordial sin or that of eternal punishment, could lead to maladaptive coping techniques that block the attempts for self-actualization, and even jeopardize individual's well-being (Anno, G.G. and Vasconcelles, E.B. in Rossano, M.J., 2008).

Theism is represented by the belief in a personal and living God. Some of the arguments of theism are based on three fundamental questions: why are religious people happier than non-religious ones? Why are religious people more generous? Why the majority of people are religious? Analyzing the data collected from many research studies, Arthur Brooks had concluded that religious people are indeed happier and, emotionally speaking, they present themselves much better than non-religious people. The relation between religiousness and personal happiness persists when certain variables such as gender, age, level of education, income, and marital status are controlled (Myers, D.G., Seybold, K.S. and Hill, P.C. in Graham, J. and Haidt, J., 2010). The odds of offering themselves volunteers and committing generous acts are greater in religious persons than in non-religious (Brooks, A.C., Gronbjerg, K.A. and Never, B., Lazerwitz, B., Pharoah, C. and Tanner, S. in Graham, J. and Haidt, J., 2010). This is valid when age, gender, income, and political adherence are controlled (Brooks, A.C. in Graham, J. and Haidt, J., 2010). As for why the majority of people are religious, the practice of religion and its rituals have evolved simultaneously, strongly related to each other (Voight, B.F., Kundaravalli, S., Wen, X., Pritchard, J.K., Williamson, S.H, et al., in Graham, J. and Haidt, J., 2010).

Atheism is a doctrine or an attitude that resides in the abnegation of any

representation of a personal and living God (Didier, J., 2009, p.28). But this abnegation isn't always explicit. In Nietzsche's opinion, there are people who have never been concerned with the existence or non-existence of God, their first and only concern being mundane, about man's situation and destination. The theorists of modern atheism were Ludwig Feuerbach and Karl Marx. They alleged that any belief in God is an alienation, a run from reality, from the fundamental question, which is not whether God exists or not, but what is the future of humankind. Therefore, atheism does not disbar the moral virtues of humanism, it just refuses the intervention of a divine Providence in world's business, and counts only on people's courage, will, and hard work. As for the reasoning that stands at the basis of atheism, there are twelve impossibility arguments, says Patrick Grim: is impossible for God to be omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect, the impossibility of attributes combinations, etc.

But how is religion seen today? Do people attend church anymore? If so, how often? In Romania, in 2005, 46% of the population declared they were attending church once a month. Therefore, Romania was the country with the most intense religious practice in Europe. In 2000, 76% of the population used to pray at least once a week (Voicu, M., 2007). A research made in Romania has differentiated, related to religious practicing, three categories: Christians who practice religion, Christians who don't practice religion, and undeclared atheists. Hierarchical, Romania is situated after Poland and Italy, with 45.3% Christians who practice religion and 51.5% Christians who don't practice religion. Undeclared atheists are represented by 2.3% of the population, and they are most likely males

(76%), with higher education, and residents of big cities. As for the declared atheists, they are very few, only 0.3% of the population declared themselves atheists (Voicu, M., 2007).

Other studies in this area of concern have shown that: morality is partially represented on the vertical dimension, but not to the persons with low interest in morality (Meier, B.P., Sellbom, M., Wygant, D.B., 2007. *Failing to take the moral high ground: Psychopathy and the vertical representation of morality*, *Personality and Individual Differences*, no. 43, pp. 757-767); parenting dimension (implication, support, and structure) is associated with adolescents' global internalization of moral values (Hardy, S.A., Padilla-Walker, L.M., Carlo, G., 2008. *Parenting dimensions and adolescent's internalization of moral values*, *Journal of Moral Education*, 37(2), pp. 222-223).

2. Methodology

2.1. Objective

The purpose of the present study is to assess adolescents' and young adults' tolerance towards the level of morality/immorality of moral values, in relation with variables such as gender, level of education and denomination. The idea for this research came from the data and observations that had been published in two studies: *Failing to take the moral high ground: the vertical representation of morality* (Meier, B.P., Sellbom, M., Wygant, D.B., 2007) and *Parenting dimensions and adolescent's internalization of moral values* (Hardy, S.A., Padilla-Walker, L.M., Carlo, G., 2008). The objective of the study is related to the issue of moral values among adolescents and young adults.

2.2. Participants and procedure

A total of 175 participants were included in the study, thus: 50 (28.6%) Orthodoxes, 50 (28.6%) Catholics, 50 (28.6%) Neo-protestants (Baptists), and 25 (14.3%) skeptics; 89 (50.9%) of them were males, and 86 (49.1%) were females; 76 (43.4%) of the participants were high-school students (11th

and 12 grade), and 99 (56.6%) of them had higher education. Participants were aged between 18 and 30 years old, with an average age of 20.41 years ($\sigma=2.85$ years).

The testing took place between June and July 2010; participants were approached at the institution where they were learning - high-school or university, thus: "Iosif Vulcan" High-School and the University of Oradea - for the Orthodox participants; Catholic High-School and the Catholic Institute - for the Catholic participants; "Emanuel" High-School and Emanuel University - for Baptist participants, and the University of Oradea for the skeptic participants (because they were harder to find, we had been able to approach only 25 skeptics).

Participants were asked to fill in two questionnaires, with no time limit. None of the participants were compelled to complete the questionnaires. There was no missing data at any of the variables.

2.3. Instruments

For this study, two questionnaires were used: *Word Stimuli* (Meier, B.P., Sellbom, M., Wygant, D.B., 2007) and *Responding Desirably on Attitudes and Opinions (RD-16)* (Schuessler, Hittle, Cardascia, 1978 in Paulhus, D.L., by Robinson, J.P., Sharer, P., Wrightsman, L.S., 1991).

Word Stimuli (W.S.) is a questionnaire proposed by Meier, B.P., Sellbom, M., and Wygant, D.B. in 2007. It consists of 10 items (words), five of which represent morality (caring, charity, nurture, trustworthy, truthful), and five - immorality (adultery, corrupt, dishonest, evil, molest). Items are scored on a nine-point Likert scale (1="high degree of immorality"; 9="high degree of morality"). Participants were asked to circle the number that best represents their personal attribution of morality/immorality degree. Thus, the lower the score given to a certain moral value, the lower is the degree of morality attributed to it (the higher is the degree of immorality), and vice-versa. The value of α Cronbach coefficient used to estimate internal consistency for items representing immorality was equal to .811, and the value of α Cronbach coefficient used to estimate internal



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consistency for items representing morality was equal to .821.

Responding Desirably on Attitudes and Opinions Scale (RD-16) consists of 16 items and was especially designed to detect socially desirable responding in attitude and opinion surveys of the general population (Schuessler, Hittle and Cardascia, 1978 in Paulhus, D.L. by Robinson, J.P., Sharer, P., Wrightsman, L.S., 1991). The subject is asked to agree or disagree with each item. The first eight items are keyed in positive direction (1 for agreement and 0 for disagreement; e.g.: „I feel that I can help others in many ways”), and the other eight items are keyed in negative direction (0 for agreement and 1 for disagreement; e.g.: „Many people are friendly only because they want something from you”). Possible scores range from 0 to 16 with higher scores indicating more desirable responding. The value of α Cronbach coefficient was equal to .575.

3. Results

The tolerance towards the level of morality/immorality of moral values differs when put in relation with the variable “sex”.

Table 3.1. shows the difference between male and female participants in perceived degree of morality/immorality associated to a set of moral values.

Table 3.1. The comparison of perceived degree of morality/immorality associated to a set of moral values, in relation with the variable “sex”

	m		z
	males	females	
adultery	88,54	87,44	-0,161
corrupt	89,89	86,05	-0,528
dishonest	93,15	82,67	-1,416
evil	93,33	82,49	-1,506

molest	89,35	86,6	-0,439
caring	80,64	95,62	-2,024*
charity	81,24	95,00	-1,882
nurture	80,00	95,28	-2,298*
trustworthy	82,04	94,16	-1,902
truthful	82,96	93,22	-1,585

*p<.05.

As for the tolerance towards the level of morality/immorality, gender is not a significant discriminator. However, the two moral values for which were found significant differences are *caring* ($z=-2.024$, $p<.05$) and *nurture* ($z=-2.298$, $p<.05$), for which girls presented higher scores, compared to boys’ scores. This is rather due to particular female characteristics or to the set of expectations from the society.

In a research conducted on 1079 Catholic and Protestant subjects (aged 13 to 16 years old) from Northern Ireland, investigating moral values and attitudes, was shown that girls are better keepers of traditional moral values than boys (Francis, L.J. and Greer, J., E., 1992).

Regarding moral consent, “Indians believe that cows are possessed by dead people’s spirits, so they won’t eat beef. In U.S.A., we don’t believe our dead relatives’ souls could rest in a cow, so we don’t have a problem eating beef. At large, what could seem a moral difference is, in fact, an agreement – we, as they do, believe that eating grandma is wrong!” (Geisler, N., L. & Turek, F., 2007).

The tolerance towards the level of morality/immorality of moral values differs when put in relation with participants’ level of education.

Table 3.2. The comparison of perceived degree of morality/immorality associated to a set of moral values, in relation with participants' level of education

	m		z
	High-school education	Higher education	
adultery	92,59	84,47	-1,165
corrupt	94,35	83,13	-1,53
dishonest	97,43	80,76	-2,236*
evil	92,73	84,37	-1,152
molest	94,19	83,25	-1,735
caring	86,86	88,88	-0,271
charity	82,11	92,53	-1,413
nurture	83,06	91,79	-1,222
trustworthy	79,70	94,37	-2,162*
truthful	85,24	90,12	-0,746

*p<.05.

As for the tolerance towards the level of morality/immorality, level of education is not a significant discriminator either, though there were found significant differences for two moral values: *dishonest* ($z=-2.236$, $p>.05$) and *trustworthy* ($z=-2.162$, $p<.05$). By comparison to high-school students, participants with higher education have shown

Table 3.3. The comparison of perceived degree of morality/immorality associated to a set of moral values, in relation with participants' denomination

	m				χ^2
	Skeptics	Orthodoxes	Catholics	Baptists	
adultery	103,64	111,42	86,74	58,02	37,629***
corrupt	84,62	109,12	86,19	70,38	16,547**
dishonest	86,78	103,29	89,52	71,80	10,438*
evil	102,74	97,29	91,61	67,73	13,66**
molest	91,72	100,86	97,62	68,66	19,044***
caring	80,48	89,25	93,14	85,37	1,319
charity	68,80	76,43	105,19	91,98	13,454**
nurture	80,22	85,42	97,64	84,83	3,186
trustworthy	88,16	84,42	76,63	102,87	9,183*
truthful	83,50	80,57	88,63	97,05	4,024

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.

As for the tolerance towards the level of morality/immorality, denomination is a significant discriminator.

Tables below show the differences between denominations, compared two-by-two. Because the distribution of the moral

Table 3.4. Comparisons according to denomination for the moral value *adultery*

		Mean Ranks							
		1		2		3		4	
n	Denomination	m _{rank}	m _{rank}	m _{rank}	m _{rank}	m _{rank}	m _{rank}	m _{rank}	m _{rank}
			1. Skeptics			34,78	39,61	42,86	35,57
	2. Orthodoxes					57,48	43,52	65,53	35,67

lower level of tolerance for considering *dishonest* immoral, and they have considered *trustworthy* more moral than high-school students did.

For high-school students, being honest and trustworthy could imply not to cheat on exams. The observed differences could be due to age, but mostly to education and life experience that people with higher education have acquired. They have come to understand the value of loyalty much deeper than high-school students; situations are more complex and it takes some uprightness to work them out.

The tolerance towards the level of morality/immorality of moral values differs when put in relation with participants' denomination

values among denominations was asymmetrical and the Mann-Whitney U test was used for the comparisons, the critical reference value for significance testing was lowered to 0.008 (according to Bonferroni's correction).

	Differences between Mean Ranks (Mann-Whitney U multiple comparisons)			
	1	2	3	4
1. Sceptics		-1,368	-0,223	-1,282
2. Orthodoxes			-1,395	-3,217*
3. Catholics				-1,830
4. Baptists				

*P<.01

In addition, Baptist participants have had a lower level of tolerance in considering *dishonest* immoral.

Table 3.7. Comparisons according to denomination for the moral value *evil*

	Denomination	Mean Ranks							
		1		2		3		4	
		m _{rank}	m _{rank}	m _{rank}	m _{rank}	m _{rank}	m _{rank}	m _{rank}	m _{rank}
evil	1. Sceptics			39,18	37,41	41,14	36,43	48,42	32,79
	2. Orthodoxes					52,11	48,89	58,77	42,23
	3. Catholics							57,29	43,71
	4. Baptists								
	Differences between Mean Ranks (Mann-Whitney U multiple comparisons)								
		1		2		3		4	
	1. Sceptics								-3,222*
	2. Orthodoxes								-3,105*
	3. Catholics								-2,578
	4. Baptists								

*P<.01

Referring to the moral value *evil*, the variable 'denomination' is a significant discriminator between Baptist participants compared to skeptic and Orthodox participants. Baptists have obtained lower

scores related to the variable in cause, proving lower tolerance towards considering it immoral.

Table 3.8. Comparisons according to denomination for the moral value *molestation*

	Denomination	Mean Ranks							
		1		2		3		4	
		m _{rank}	m _{rank}	m _{rank}	m _{rank}	m _{rank}	m _{rank}	m _{rank}	m _{rank}
molest	1. Sceptics			32,54	40,73	33,38	40,31	41,80	36,10
	2. Orthodoxes					51,75	49,25	59,38	41,62
	3. Catholics							59,06	41,94
	4. Baptists								
	Differences between Mean Ranks (Mann-Whitney U multiple comparisons)								
		1		2		3		4	
	1. Sceptics								-1,808
	2. Orthodoxes								-3,973*
	3. Catholics								-3,833*
	4. Baptists								

*P<.01

Baptists consider *molestation* more immoral than Orthodoxes and Catholics do, differences being statistically significant.



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Table 3.9. Comparisons according to denomination for the moral value *charity*

Denomination	Mean Ranks							
	1		2		3		4	
	m _{rank}	m _{rank}	m _{rank}	m _{rank}	m _{rank}	m _{rank}	m _{rank}	m _{rank}
1. Sceptics			35,76	39,12	27,68	43,16	31,36	41,32
2. Orthodoxes					42,26	58,74	46,05	54,95
3. Catholics							54,29	46,71
4. Baptists								
charity	Differences between Mean Ranks (Mann-Whitney U multiple comparisons)							
	1		2		3		4	
1. Sceptics			-0,659		-3,073*		-1,945	
2. Orthodoxes					-2,993*		-1,601	
3. Catholics							-1,411	
4. Baptists								

*P<.01

By inspecting the table above, it can be seen that Catholic participants have registered significantly higher scores to *charity* compared to skeptic and Orthodox participants. For that matter, Catholics consider generosity more moral than skeptics and Orthodoxes do.

Table 3.9. Comparisons according to denomination for the moral value *loyalty*

Denomination	Mean Ranks							
	1		2		3		4	
	m _{rank}	m _{rank}	m _{rank}	m _{rank}	m _{rank}	m _{rank}	m _{rank}	m _{rank}
1. Sceptics			39,06	37,47	41,3	36,35	33,8	40,1
2. Orthodoxes					52,51	48,49	45,44	55,56
3. Catholics							42,79	58,21
4. Baptists								
trustworthy	Differences between Mean Ranks (Mann-Whitney U multiple comparisons)							
	1		2		3		4	
1. Sceptics			-0,336		-1,011		-1,475	
2. Orthodoxes					-0,757		-2,096	
3. Catholics							-3,053*	
4. Baptists								

*P<.008

Baptists had higher scores than Catholics for *trustworthy* too, meaning they consider this value of a higher morality than Catholics do.

4. Discussions

Concerning the issue of moral values, in particular the tolerance towards moral/immoral values among adolescents and young adults, we can assert, based on numerous studies including the present, that there are a few significant differences among denominations. Thus, for the comparison of skeptics' scores with Orthodoxes' and Catholics' scores, there were found differences for the moral value 'charity' ($p < .01$), for which Catholic participants presented higher scores, meaning they consider charity more moral than skeptics and Orthodoxes do. However, Catholic participants came out desirable in relation with the value 'charity' ($r = .381$, $p < .01$). This could be due to collectivism, to liabilities and benefits that Catholic people are willing to carry out in order to feel they belong. M. Farias and M. Lallje (2008) have noticed that Catholics give more importance to collectivism compared to the non-religious group. They have high scores to conservatism and uniformity. Non-religious people have higher values to hedonism, stimulation and self-directing – which emphasizes individual's independence.

It is known that religious persons are more likely to offer themselves as volunteers and to commit charitable acts (Brooks, A.C., Gronbjerg, K.A. and Never, B., Lazerwitz, B., Pharoah, C. and Tanner, S. in Graham, J. and Haidt, J., 2010). Likewise, people tend to be more generous when they are moved by other people's pain (Batson, C.D. and Shaw, L.L., Slovic, P. in Graham, J. and Haidt, J., 2010), suggesting that individual differences can predict one's tendency of being or not charitable.

When the scores of skeptics and Baptist participants were compared, we found significant differences for the values 'adultery' and 'evil' ($p < .01$), for which Baptists showed a lower tolerance towards considering these values immoral. The practice of religion seems to assure the basis for practicing morality, by helping in acquiring moral abilities.

For the comparison of Orthodox and Baptist participants, we found significant differences ($p < .01$) for 'adultery', 'corrupt', 'dishonest', 'evil', and 'molest', for which Baptist participants showed lower tolerance towards considering these values immoral. However, Baptists were desirable in relation with 'corrupt' ($r = -.295$, $p < .05$) and 'dishonest' ($r = -.346$, $p < .05$).

For the comparison of Catholics' with Baptists' scores, we obtained significant differences ($p < .01$) for 'adultery' and 'molest', for which Baptist participants showed lower tolerance towards considering these values immoral. Baptist participants have considered 'trustworthy' of a higher morality than Catholic participants. However, Baptists gave desirable responses to 'trustworthy' ($r = .478$, $p < .01$).

5. Conclusions

By apprehending the mechanism by which the moral value system works, the use of socialization could be priceless not only for the youth, but for schools, churches and other institutions of the kind. This way, it is easier to understand and interpret certain attitudes of adolescents and young adults, in the context of certain morally controversial situations. Parents and educators should find ways to improve their relationship with the adolescents, and to favor their autonomy, self-efficiency, and personal identity. In addition, the results are useful in adolescents and young adults counseling, as the information is global, but not shallow.

The limits of this study are represented by the participants' self-reporting and small sample size. Future studies could take into consideration, along with participants' self-reporting, other variables such as parents' evaluations; thus, the relation between parenting styles and moral values attribution could be evaluated. However, past studies have shown that there is a greater accuracy in adolescents' self-reporting compared to parents' evaluations concerning internal attributes (Clarke, G.N., Lewinsohn, P.M., Hops, H., Seeley, J.R., 1992, in Hardy, S.A., Padilla-Walker, L.M. Carlo, G., 2008).



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Furthermore, future research could use a scale that assesses the level of atheism and agnosticism. This scale could differentiate the way moral values are distributed among irreligious population. In addition, larger samples and a more complex design could be used in evaluating ethnic differences concerning the role of parenting styles in moral values attribution.

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